The Fog of War and Man's Inhumanity to Man

 The flight from Travis Air Force Base near Oakland, California, to Bien Hoa Air Base in South Vietnam was one of the longest I had ever experienced. The journey lasted eighteen flight hours.  Our airplane was a Continental Airlines charter with a full load of U.S. soldiers (about 300).  Along the way, the plane made two scheduled stops: the first in Hawaii, and the second at Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines. Bien Hoa Air Base is located about a half hour north of Saigon. 

 

As we were approaching our landing at Bien Hoa I could see flashes of what appeared to be artillery fire to the right of the airplane.  Soon after landing we were rushed into an Isuzu bus and driven to the St. George Hotel in the Cholon section of Saigon.  This was May of 1968 during the Viet Cong Tet Offensive.  Fighting on Saigon city streets was in progress as we approached Cholon.  The sound of helicopters overhead and the noise of combat was surreal.  As we were led into the hotel, I noticed a fellow soldier take out his cassette recorder and record the sound of battle.  I asked him what he was going to do with it and he said that he would send it to his parents. I did not ask any further questions.  As we settled in the hotel, Australian soldiers were drinking at the bar on the first floor of the hotel.  

After a couple of days in Saigon, and duty at Tan Son Nhat Airport I finally reached my duty station, First Field Force, Headquarters II Corps in Nha Trang, on the central coast of South Vietnam just north of Cam Ran Bay.  Upon arriving at Camp McDermott, a U.S. Army base, I saw a sign that read:  “Even though I walk in the Valley of the shadow of evil, I fear no evil for I am the evilest son of a bitch in the valley “(a bad reference to Psalm 23).  Welcome to a new world, I thought, where there is a different moral compass.  As I discovered later, in some cases there was no compass at all. An example was the My Lai Massacre, where about 500 Vietnamese civilians were killed by U.S. soldiers.  Lieutenant William Calley was Court Martialed and convicted but spent less than three years of “house arrest” and his sentence commuted by President Nixon.  Wars do this to men in battle; some lose all contact with their moral compass.  In a recent book on the invasion of Sicily in 1943 called “Sicily ‘43” by James Holland, it describes at least two occasions when American soldier executed captured Italian prisoners.  None of the soldiers faced any discipline. 

 

In World War II, the Nazis and the Russians and perhaps the Japanese were the most brutal.  First prize would go to the Nazis and the Russians.  The Nazi invasion of Russia was murderous.  The Nazis just killed everyone they encountered and had no hesitation about it.  The Russians were brutal beyond belief.  They would kill their own soldiers who had been captured and managed to return.  Russian commanders would order suicidal frontal assaults, and any Russian soldier who hesitated, was shot by his own men.  Russian prisoners of war were killed or starved to death.  It is estimated that between 350,000 and 1,000,000 German prisoners of war died in captivity. Another estimated 50,000 Italian Russian prisoners of war died in captivity.  Man’s inhumanity to man has no bounds and war makes men abandon any moral compass.

 

For more reading on this and related topic, see the following:

1. Sicily ’43, James Holland

2. Leningrad State of Siege, Michael Jones

3. Kiev 1941, David Stahel

4. Stalingrad, Anthony Beevor

A Comparative Analysis of the French Indochina War (1945–1954) and the United States Vietnam War Experience (1955-1975) - Contrasts and Parallels in Foreign Intervention and Decolonization

 

Introduction

The history of Vietnam in the twentieth century is deeply marked by two prolonged conflicts involving foreign powers: the French Indochina War (1945–1954) and the United States Vietnam War (1955–1975). Both wars were shaped by the context of colonialism on the French part and the global struggle against communism in the West, yet they differed in their origins, strategies, outcomes, and legacies. This analysis compares the French and American experiences in Vietnam, examining their aims, strategies, challenges, and long-term impacts.

Historical Background

Before the onset of World War II, Vietnam had been a French colony for over six decades, forming part of French Indochina—which included present-day Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. During World War II, the Japanese occupation weakened French control and emboldened nationalist and communist movements, especially the Viet Minh. The Viet Minh, a coalition of nationalist and communist forces founded in 1941 under Ho Chi Minh, sought Vietnamese independence from foreign rule. With Japan’s surrender in 1945, the power vacuum in Vietnam intensified local struggles for independence. In the aftermath of WWII, France sought to reassert its colonial authority, leading to the outbreak of the First Indochina War in 1946. Meanwhile, as Cold War rivalry escalated, Western intervention shifted: following the French defeat at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954, the United States gradually became the principal actor in Vietnam.

Objectives and Motives

French in Indochina (1945–1954)

The primary French aim was to reclaim its colonial possessions and restore its prewar status as an imperial power. French leaders considered Indochina vital for economic exploitation, prestige, and strategic presence in Southeast Asia. The war was thus fundamentally an effort at recolonization, confronting Vietnamese demands for independence. As the conflict intensified, French motives became entangled with anti-communist sentiment, especially as the Viet Minh were both nationalist and communist.

United States in Vietnam (1955–1975)

In contrast, the United States’ involvement was rooted less in colonial ambition than in the geopolitical imperatives of the Cold War. American leaders viewed Vietnam as a critical battleground to contain communism and uphold the credibility of U.S. commitments worldwide. The “domino theory” posited that the fall of Vietnam to communism would precipitate the collapse of Western-aligned regimes throughout Asia. Thus, U.S. intervention was framed as a defense of democracy and freedom, though it ultimately entailed support for fragile, often undemocratic governments in South Vietnam.

Strategies and Military Operations

French Military Approach

The French campaign relied on conventional military tactics, including the use of professional troops, colonial forces, and local auxiliaries. France attempted to establish strongholds in urban centers and key transportation routes while conducting large-scale operations against Viet Minh bases in the countryside. The French established the “hedgehog” defense—fortified outposts in hostile territory—and sought to control the population through administrative and police measures. Nevertheless, French forces struggled to adapt to the guerrilla tactics and popular support enjoyed by the Viet Minh.

 

Both the French and American strategies were hampered by significant resource limitations and unreliable support, factors that undermined their long-term prospects in Vietnam. The French, for instance, often struggled to field enough troops; by the end of their campaign, they relied heavily on colonial forces and North African units, indicating difficulties in securing sufficient metropolitan soldiers. Supply lines were stretched thin over challenging terrain, and logistical operations suffered from frequent Viet Minh ambushes and sabotage. Furthermore, French political backing was inconsistent, with mounting opposition at home as war expenses escalated and casualties mounted—contributing to wavering resolve within the government and among the public.

Similarly, American forces faced their own constraints. Despite deploying over half a million troops at the height of U.S. involvement, the task of securing both rural and urban regions proved overwhelming. The complexity of the terrain, long supply routes vulnerable to guerrilla attacks, and increasing antiwar sentiment in the United States eroded political will. Congressional debates over funding and strategy exemplified the uncertainty of American commitment, while the South Vietnamese government’s instability further complicated U.S. efforts to build lasting support.

 

While military victory was sometimes within reach, sustaining peace required ongoing conflict, daily casualties, and unsustainable expenses—realities that ultimately dashed hopes for long-term success for both nations. Local forces leveraged their intimate knowledge of Vietnam’s geography, strong community ties, and highly adaptive guerrilla tactics. These advantages enabled the Viet Minh and later the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army to conduct effective operations, blend into the population, and recover from setbacks in ways the foreign armies could not match. In the end, local determination and strategic ingenuity proved decisive in undermining the efforts of outside powers to maintain control.

American Military Approach

The U.S. military strategy evolved over time, initially emphasizing training and equipping South Vietnamese forces. As the conflict escalated, the United States deployed hundreds of thousands of troops and unleashed massive firepower, including extensive air strikes (such as Operation Rolling Thunder), chemical defoliants (Agent Orange), and search-and-destroy missions. American commanders sought to “win hearts and minds” through pacification programs while also engaging in conventional battles, notably the Tet Offensive in 1968. Despite technological superiority, U.S. forces faced persistent guerrilla resistance from both the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army. 

Challenges and Limitations

French Obstacles

France confronted several challenges: an unfamiliar and inhospitable terrain, language and cultural barriers, limited resources, and a lack of popular support among the Vietnamese population. The Viet Minh’s ability to mobilize peasants and wage protracted guerrilla war undermined French efforts to secure the countryside. Moreover, international opinion increasingly favored Vietnamese independence, and support from the communist bloc—especially China and the Soviet Union—strengthened the Viet Minh militarily and diplomatically. 

American Obstacles

The United States faced its own difficulties. The South Vietnamese government was plagued by corruption, incompetence, and lack of legitimacy, which complicated efforts to build an effective fighting force and gain popular backing. Like the French before them, Americans underestimated the resolve and adaptability of their adversaries. The jungle terrain, ambiguous front lines, and the seamless integration of guerrilla fighters into local communities frustrated U.S. military planners. Mounting casualties, media coverage, and domestic opposition further eroded support for the war.

The Role of Ideology and Nationalism

In both conflicts, the Vietnamese resistance was driven by potent forms of nationalism and anti-colonialism. Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh effectively united diverse groups under the banner of independence and social revolution, leveraging communist ideology as a force multiplier. For many Vietnamese, the struggle was not just against foreign domination, but for self-determination and social justice. In both wars, the foreign powers failed to grasp the depth of Vietnamese nationalism, mistaking it for mere communist subversion.

International Dimensions

French War in the Context of Decolonization

The French war unfolded amidst the global wave of decolonization, with Asian and African countries demanding sovereignty. International sympathy increasingly favored the Vietnamese cause, as seen in the debates within the United Nations and among emerging non-aligned states. The communists received material and moral support from China (after 1949) and the Soviet Union, giving the Viet Minh a strategic edge.

U.S. War in the Context of the Cold War

American intervention was deeply enmeshed in the bipolar struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States. North Vietnam received extensive aid from the communist bloc, enabling it to sustain military operations and political resistance. The war’s escalation risked drawing in China and the USSR, raising the specter of superpower confrontation. Global opinion grew increasingly critical of U.S. actions, with widespread protest movements and diplomatic isolation.

Endings and Outcomes

French Defeat and the Geneva Accords

The French war ended in disaster at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, where Viet Minh forces besieged and overwhelmed a major French garrison. The subsequent Geneva Accords divided Vietnam at the 17th parallel and set the stage for national elections, which were never held. France withdrew from Indochina, marking the end of its colonial empire in Asia. The outcome reflected the triumph of indigenous nationalism and the limits of colonial power.

American Withdrawal and the Fall of Saigon

After years of stalemate, escalating costs, and growing opposition, the United States initiated a phased withdrawal from Vietnam, culminating in the Paris Peace Accords of 1973. The South Vietnamese government collapsed in 1975, and North Vietnamese forces captured Saigon, unifying the country under communist rule. The effectiveness of the Paris Peace Accords was questioned by many observers at the time, as evidenced by repeated ceasefire violations documented by international monitors and the rapid resumption of hostilities. The American defeat had profound consequences: a loss of prestige, domestic turmoil, and a reevaluation of interventionist policies. For example, the war's aftermath led to widespread protests, legislative changes such as the War Powers Act of 1973, and a period of national introspection regarding the limits and costs of foreign interventions.

Comparative Analysis

·      Similarities: Both the French and American wars in Vietnam were ultimately unsuccessful efforts to impose foreign visions on a determined and mobilized population. Both relied on superior military technology, struggled to win local support, and underestimated the importance of Vietnamese nationalism. Each war ended in withdrawal and defeat, with Vietnam achieving unity and independence.

·      Differences: French intervention was primarily colonial, seeking to reclaim lost imperial holdings, while American involvement was motivated by ideological containment of communism. The duration, scale, and intensity of the U.S. war far eclipsed that of the French, with far greater resources expended and casualties incurred. American intervention had broader global implications, directly linked to the Cold War. The French war ended with partition and a promise of elections; the American war ended with outright unification of Vietnam under communist rule.

Legacy and Impact

The legacy of these wars continues to shape Vietnam and the world. For Vietnam, decades of conflict left deep scars but forged a resilient national identity. For France and the United States, the wars prompted soul-searching about foreign policy, military intervention, and the limits of power. The lessons of Vietnam—about the challenges of counterinsurgency, the pitfalls of underestimating nationalism, and the costs of intervention—remain relevant to policymakers and historians alike.

Conclusion

The French Indochina War and the American Vietnam War stand as cautionary tales of foreign intervention in the 20th century. Despite differences in context and motivation, both powers failed to achieve their goals in the face of Vietnamese determination. Today, the history of these conflicts serves as a reminder of the complex interplay between local aspirations and global rivalries, and the enduring significance of Vietnam’s struggle for independence and unity.

 

The Folly of US Involvement in the Vietnam War: Quagmire and Betrayal

 Wayne Harmon enlisted in the Marines right out of Dominquez High School in Compton, California in 1966. He became one of the 60,000 American servicemen killed in action in Vietnam.  Just 21 years-old, one of two children and the only son.  He was also my neighbor.  Wayne was a member of Company H, 2^nd Battalion, 9^thMarines.  The Virtual Wall (VirtualWall.org) of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial has this summary of the fierce battle that he took part in which resulted in his death on 15 May 1967: 

“In the spring of 1967, NVA forces based in and supplied from the DMZ were conducting major operations from Khe Sanh in the west to the coast. On 24 April a major battle bagan at Khe Sanh, NVA forces repeatedly cut Highway 9 between Cam Lo and Khe Sanh, and initiated major mortar, rocket, and artillery attacks against Marine installations at Gio Linh, Camp Carroll, and Dong Ha. At 0300 on 08 May the NVA staged a major effort against the Marine observation post on Hill 158 at Con Thien, two miles south of the DMZ's southern border, with simultaneous diversionary attacks against Camp Carroll, Gio Linh, and Dong Ha. Although the elements of 1st Bn, 4th Marines, held out at Con Thien, they lost 44 men killed and 110 wounded. On 10 May a Marine A-4E (BuNo 151997) was hit by surface-to-air missiles fired from just north of the DMZ; the pilot, Major Robert L. Snyder, was killed in the incident.”

 

The Virtual Wall summary just described here lists all the Marine units involved and the casualties by unit.   In my reading, I counted no less than 238 Marines KIA and 1,549 wounded.  This was a serious and vicious battle.  The North Vietnamese Army (NVA) amassed a large force, and a fierce battle began with high powered weapons.  This, in a way, was a foreshadowing of what was to come in February of 1968 with the NVA’s Tet Offensive, an equally brutal battle.  The American historian, Mark Bowden, in his book, Huè 1968: A Turning Point of the American War in Vietnam describes this historic battle in detail.    Both battles were won by US forces, but the price was huge in men killed and wounded, a Pyrrhic victory.  US forces won all battles with the enemy, but this was not enough, for the enemy was never defeated.  They lost all engagements, but their strategy was to endure and wear out the Americans; indeed, they did eventually.  Time was on their side.  Eventually Americans and politicians became weary; first they pulled out all US forces and then reneged on our promises from the Paris Peace Accords to resupply South Vietnamese forces.  The end came quickly in 1975.  This was something JFK’s Whiz Kids advisers did not foresee nor were they capable of understanding.  We paid a heavy price:  60,000 killed in action and another 300,000 wounded; not to mention all the money spent on the war.  It is estimated that the United States spent nearly one trillion dollars in 1960s money on the Vietnam war: the equivalent of eight trillion dollars in today’s money.   A lot of falsehoods have endured about the Vietnam war.  Here is a terrific five-minute video by Bruce Herschensohn explaining what really happened:  Click here to view it.

 

How did we get involved in this war?  Why?  These are questions that are still asked.  A new book written by Charles Trueheart, the son of the Assistant US Ambassador to Vietnam in 1961, Bill Trueheart, called  “Diplomats at War:  Friendship and Betrayal on the Brink of the Vietnam War” is revealing.   Trueheart was a 10-year-old when he accompanied his father to Saigon in 1961.  This book gives a personal view of everyday happenings, the characters involved and the sheer madness of what the US administration of President Kennedy was up to.  If you dislike politicians, you will absolutely despise these guys.  They were green bureaucrats, uninformed, arrogant, full of themselves and mindless, with my apology to people with disabilities.  The blind leading the blind.  I would call them The Not Ready for Prime-time Players.  JFK was no different.  Led by Averell Harriman, Bobby Kennedy, Dean Rusk and the former Ford Motor Company executive, Robert McNamara, JFK’s Secretary of Defense.  None had any experience in Southeast Asia, its culture or its people, nor any knowledge of world affairs for what they were about to, unknowingly, design.  McNamara’s background was in economics and management. He resigned in 1967 and admitted his failures.  Click here for a related story. It was too late to reverse the course of the war.  McNamara’s son, Craig McNamara, wrote a book about his father’s role in Vietnam called “Because Our Fathers Lied: A memoir of Truth.”   McNamara was a disaster as a defense secretary.  Check out this article on the damage he did to the Strategic Air Command.  Click here.

 

Of all the characters in this sad and tragic story, one person stands out:  Averell Harriman.  The ex-Governor of New York, Harriman was arrogant, self-deluded, abrasive and a generally nasty person.  JFK idealized him.  Harriman was also very wrong on everything he was involved with.  Harriman badly wanted to be Secretary of State.  Instead, JFK appointed him as Assistant Secretary of State for Far East Affairs. He probably did not know where the far east was unless he looked at a map. Trueheart tells the story of a cabinet meeting with the Ambassador of South Vietnam, Fritz Nolting.  While Nolting was speaking, Harriman yells at him and tells him “Shut up, nobody wants to hear from you,” in front of the President and other cabinet members.  JFK rebuked Harriman and said “I want to hear what he has to say.  In a 1976 interview with Harriman’s biographer, Rudy Abramson, Nolting says this: “Nobody, in my opinion is as directly responsible for that disaster as Averell Harriman.” That disaster is referring to is Vietnam (p298).

 

Another excellent book on this subject dealing with the early years prior to, and the early stages of the war, is “The Lost Mandate of Heaven, The American Betrayal of Ngo Dinh Diem President of Vietnam.” By Geoffrey Shaw.  I have another blog post based on this book:  Click here to read it.   This book deals with the same mistakes described here.  Shaw describes in detail the role that the media played and how they were so influential on US politicians and public opinion about the war.  David Halberstam, the influential New York Times reporter and Walter Cronkite, the stately professorial looking CBS News Anchorman had a lot of influence on the rest of the media as well as public opinion.  Halberstam was a green 27-year-old journalist with an eye on shaping the narrative about Vietnam; a narrative that the NY Times promoted.  Most of it was negative. As it turned out, they were right. Trueheart tells the story of French journalist François Sully who was once asked by the US Ambassador why he always looked at the hole in the donut in his reporting about happenings in Vietnam?  Sully responded:  Because, Mr. Ambassador, there is a hole in the donut.

 

There is no doubt that the Kennedy Administration, his advisors and functionaries colored the reality on the ground, and in some ways disguised the truth, i.e., lied.  I recall that the administration promoted the body count; the number of enemy killed, as a way of showing the progress of the war.  Journalists were, in some cases, expelled for unfavorable reporting of the reality on the ground, such as François Sully, the French reporter and the NY Times reporter who preceded David Halberstam. 

 

The Spanish/American philosopher George Santayana coined the phrase: “Those who forget their history are condemned to repeat it.”  The Vietnam war was one excellent example of this famous saying.  We learned nothing from history.  We thought we were better than the others; we were arrogant, self-delusional and outright stupid when it came to what the US did in Vietnam prior to the explosion of all-out war.   I am a US Army Vietnam Veteran.  I was in Vietnam in 1968-69, the hottest year of the war and a time when we had 550,000 troops there: the highest number in the war.

 

As soon as the French pulled out of Vietnam after their defeat in the famous battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954, the United States, basically became the new colonial overlords and started what they could not finish, except they were too arrogant and self-deluded to know it; thinking that they could do it better than the French.  This they did not apologize for.  They decided what they believed was needed to be done and then it was the US Ambassador’s job to get Diem to agree to it and do it.  Do what we say or else was their attitude.  Diem and his brother Nhu were murdered November 3, 1963, in a coup with the support of JFK, the CIA and the Kennedy administration.  Without US support the Vietnamese generals would have never done a coup, this is crystal clear.

 

 Another of the craziest idea the Americans came up with was the Strategic Hamlet Program by which people would be relocated from their villages, their homes torched, and new people would be put there to defend against the Viet Cong.  The Vietnamese were incredulous; they knew this would not work, and, in fact, it never worked.  But “father knows best;” just do what we say, after all, we’re Americans and we know better. 

 

 I was a huge JFK fan as a youth.  The more I learn about his failures, however, the more I believe he was incompetent and way out of his league.  In 1963 JFK worried more about being re-elected in 1964 than doing the right thing in Vietnam. He sensed that Vietnam was going to end badly for the US and considered ending the US involvement, but he wanted to wait until he was re-elected in 1964 to do it. The murder of Diem and his brother opened Pandora’s Box and South Vietnam spiraled out of control.  It was the American war now.  Every replacement for Diem was an utter failure. From 1963 to 1975 there were 12 different leaders of South Vietnam: all total failures.  Within a month of the coup, the ruling junta was itself overthrown. The North Vietnamese were shrewd; they knew how to measure US resolve; they knew that time was on their side; it was. They always pushed the right button on public opinion.  One example was the Buddhist monk’s self-immolation during the Diem regime in 1963. They figured this would galvanize public opinion against the war: It did.

 

Trueheart tells the story about how Saigon was being inundated with American politicians.  In December 1962 the senior US Foreign Service Officer, U. Alexis Johnson wired Washington warning them of the many Congressional delegations arriving in Saigon; they called them “codels,” exasperating the local officials.  When the administration’s leading hawks, like General Maxwell Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Walt Rostow, JFK’s deputy national security advisor went to Vietnam to assess the situation in 1961, they advised JFK that he needed about 8,000 US combat troops there to support the South Vietnamese forces.  When Kennedy heard this, he had to figure out how he could pull this off since the 1954 Geneva Agreement after the French withdrawal was that no more than about 600 US troops could be stationed in Vietnam.  This was never taken seriously by the US.  The troops were sent, and the American casualties started.  During the Kennedy Administration the number of US KIA was 120; it increased exponentially year after year.  

 

In less than three years of the Kennedy Administration two spectacular failures occurred:  The Bay of Pigs in Cuba and the start of the Vietnam War.

 

Concluding Thoughts

 

What were they thinking?  We had just finished World War II and Korea.  The French were defeated by 1954.  The colonial period was at an end.  Why get involved in another war that could not possibly be won?  Where were the clear-thinking men?   Could they not relate with the failure of the French?  We make the same mistakes, over and over.  Some examples:  Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan.  When will they learn?

 

 

How the Vietnam War was Hijacked by the Press

I recently attended a presentation by Ron Kovic at the Manhattan Beach, California Library for his new book called Hurricane Street.  Kovic is one of the best known Vietnam War critics and activist;  he is also one of the casualties of the Vietnam War.  He has been a paraplegic since 1968 when he was critically wounded in combat. The book is about Kovic's struggle with the VA in the 1970s to get adequate medical treatment for his wounds.   Steve Lopez, columnist for the Los Angeles Times, wrote a nice piece on Kovic recently.

How much does the average American know about the Vietnam war?  I would guess not very much.  A new book I just finished called The Lost Mandate of Heaven, The American Betrayal of Ngo Dinh Diem, President of Vietnam, by Canadian historian Geoffrey Shaw is a powerful testimony of how the United States got involved in Vietnam; it deals with the crucial events leading to war, from 1959 to the murder of Diem, in a 1963 coup orchestrated and sponsored by the Kennedy Administration.

As you can see by this blog, history is one of my interests.  Vietnam history is a special interest to me since I'm a Vietnam War veteran, having served in the U.S. Army in Vietnam from May of 1968 to May of 1969.  As I read "The Lost Mandate of Heaven" my anger and disgust grew exponentially.  I would close the book and scream about how incompetent President John Kennedy and his advisers were; to my wife's dismay.  A personal note: I have been an admirer of John Kennedy since 1960, and still have a picture of him in my home.  The day he was killed was one of worst days of my life. Camelot, however, became a big nightmare, as I studied the history.   Here are the main points that pop out from the book:

• The Kennedy Administration was stacked with one of the most snobbish Ivy League elites ever, headed by the the strong-willed and arrogant Averell Harriman, a former Governor of New York, who turned out to be wrong on everything, and a complete disaster for our history.  There were wise advisers but Kennedy, himself ill informed, dismissed their advice and deferred to Harriman, a man he looked up to with a childlike wonder,
• The Americans were totally clueless about the culture and people of Vietnam, nor did they care to learn,
• The American press, led mainly by New York Times reporters, and by David Halberstam in particular, purposely slanted their reporting to fit their agenda and ignore all positive developments. South Vietnamese leaders bitterly complained about the negative reporting,
• The Americans were bent on making all decisions about the war to the exclusion of the Vietnamese who knew best; to disagree with them would incur their bitter wrath,
• The Kennedy Administration ignored the best advise from their own military and political advisers such as their ambassador in Vietnam, Frederick Nolting, CIA Saigon Station Chief, William Colby, Secretary of Defense  Robert McNamara, and General Maxwell Taylor, Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as those who were qualified for such advice such as the British, the French and many other nations who had direct experience with the situation in Vietnam,
• The critical event leading to the coup that killed Diem was the Buddhist uprising in the Spring of 1963, which we learned later, was incited and supported by the North Vietnamese, but promoted by the U.S. press in order to discredit Diem and get him removed from power, for which they pushed for forcefully by their negative reporting,
• President Kennedy was more worried about his re-election in 1964 and the bad press about the situation in Vietnam than following the right advice - advice that was put to him in no uncertain  terms by top leaders of his administration and others.

The Vietnam war was lost before one American combat soldier arrived in Vietnam.  How so?  The answers are complex but let me summarize.  Strike one was the ineffective and bone-headed advice from his trusted advisers, referred to as the Harriman Group, led by the bull-headed Averell Harriman .  The Harriman Group consisted of Chester Bowles, Michael Forrestal, John Kenneth Galbraith, Roger Hilsman, Paul Kattenburg, Joseph Mendenhall, William Sullivan, and James Thomson.  Strike two was the equally uninformed and senseless Laos Neutrality Agreement signed by Kennedy in 1962, which proved to be a complete farce.  Strike three was the Buddhist uprising of 1963 which led to the military coup that murdered Diem and his brother.  This, without a doubt, was the biggest gift to the North Vietnamese.  They never foresaw being so lucky.  With Diem dead, chaos ensued and defeat was insured.  The facts are that no other South Vietnamese leader had any success as Diem had.  This was foretold by Kennedy's advisers whom he had ignored.  They had explained this very scenario.  Kennedy did not listen.  The Americans, basically shot themselves in both feet.  In the Forward to "The Lost Mandate" the author, Geoffrey Shaw,  puts it this way:  

The character of Diem is consistent, noble, and aware of the slander waged against him.  The members of the State Department - Averell Harriman, Roger Hillsman, Henry Cabot Lodge, and others are seen a vain and vindictive, ideological   and poorly informed.  Laos' neutrality was dealt with in such a way that the North Vietnamese could use the country as a conduit to bypass the northern border of South Vietnam.  This Laotian "neutrality" was the work of Harriman and made defending South Vietnam almost impossible.  North Vietnamese units came into South Vietnam.

Chapter four of the book adds this about the failed policy of the Laos Neutrality Agreement: "Kennedy's leading advocates for a new policy toward Laos had strayed into serious error.  They had believed that neutrality would succeed where arms and the best efforts of the more experienced French had been unsuccessful.  Further proof that Kennedy's men failed at what they set out to do in Laos manifested itself years later when the Americans were heavily engaged with their own forces in South Vietnam.  By then, according to Douglas Pike, the NVA totally controlled the Pathet Lao."

The Laos Neutrality Agreement was the work of Averell Harriman.  He failed to see that a signed piece of paper and reality on the ground was quite another.  Once the agreement was signed by Kennedy, Harriman met with Diem in Saigon and told him, in no uncertain terms that he must sign it.  From this meeting on both men took to a deep hate for the other.  Diem knew that this agreement was pure folly, Harriman believed that a signed piece of paper could solve the communist insurgency in Laos.  This naiveté, basically defined the whole Vietnam American experience.

From the beginning, the Americans went into South Vietnam with a smug, superior attitude, as if only they knew best how to handle the war against the Viet Cong (VC).  Diem, on the other hand, was a very savvy, cultured and revered leader of his people.  He understood his people and his culture.  The Americans, could care less.  Unless you toed their line, you were summarily dismissed and, as was the case, even murdered for not following their orders.

Just about everyone understood the value of Diem; the French, who had ruled Vietnam for centuries, realized this.  The VC certainly knew it.  Many American leaders knew this too such as Ambassador Nolting, top military leaders, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, even Vice President Johnson. One of North Vietnamese main tools in undermining the South Vietnamese was to undermine Diem.  The preface to the book puts it this way: "Ngo Dinh Diem, possessed the Confucian Mandate of Heaven, a moral and political authority that was widely recognized by the South Vietnamese."

The U.S. news media played a huge role in destroying Diem. In Chapter two of the book, it is described like this:  "The role of the American liberal news media played in destroying the relations between Ngo Dinh Diem and the U.S. government should not be underestimated.  According to William Colby, Diem's fatal error was that he did not realize the impact of the news media."

The role of the American press cannot be overstated.  Although there were many successes in the country by the Diem government, the American press chose to give another view. The American press was staffed by young, green ideologues, such as New York Times reporter 27 year-old David Halberstam and Neil Sheehan of United Press International.  These "journalists," instead of focusing on what was going right in Vietnam, took it upon themselves to demonize Ngo Dinh Diem and accused him of corruption and being an authoritarian (seems that theses young punks knew better than the savvy Vietnamese on how to run their county. These clueless young Americans knew nothing about Vietnam).  CIA station chief, William Colby, recognized this right away as being totally wrong.

The press started causing all kinds of havoc, to the point of sabotaging the work of U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Frederick Nolting.  Halberstam's daily drip of negative reporting seems to have mirrored the New York Times editorial line.  Halberstam, a gifted writer, began the conditioning of American public opinion which proved too much for a naive new President Kennedy, worried about his re-election in 1964.   In Chapter Eight, the author says it like this,   "Later in August 1963, Nolting's suspicions that Halberstam was catering to New York Times editorial bias were reinforced.  He received reports from a trusted colleague that Halberstam had been at the Caravelle Bar (a popular place for American reporters to congregate) "proudly displaying a telegram from his newspaper in New York, which said in substance: "Good going. Keep it up.  State Department is beginning to see it our way."   In the 1960s, when there were only three TV networks, they followed the lead of the New York Times; whatever the Times said was what they presented in their nightly news.  This still happens today, although to a lesser extent.

The Buddhist Crisis of 1963 was the smoking gun that the American press needed to sabotage the American effort in Vietnam.  They seized this as the final proof that Diem was corrupt and too authoritarian and he must be removed. This crisis, it was later learned, was instigated and supported by the North Vietnamese and VC.  The North Vietnamese were very savvy about what would disturb Americans the most.  They played this crisis like a violin masterpiece.  The U.S. media fell for it, as did the Kennedy administration.  "The communists concluded that the Vietnamese president's weakest point was American reluctance to continue supporting an undemocratic leader.  They were astute enough to realize that the tail wagging the dog of U.S. foreign policy was American public opinion."  The NY Times, basically won.  They snowballed a weak administration and took over the narrative. The author continues in Chapter 10:  "The Buddhist protests therefore would seem to have been masterfully planned acts of political manipulation carefully directed at American public opinion in order to destroy U.S. policy in South Vietnam."  

With allies like the NY Times, who needs enemies?  Chapter 10 of the book continues: "According to journalist John Mechlin, the American press in South Vietnam during the Buddhist crisis had been guilty of inaccurate or even biased reporting.  In a scathing article (September 20, 1963) that led to the protest resignation of Charles Mohr, its chief correspondent for Southeast Asia, Time asserted: "the press corps on the scene is helping to compound the very confusion that it should be untangling for its readers at home...They pool their convictions, information, misinformation and grievances...The have covered a complex situation from only one angle, as if their own conclusions offered all the necessary illumination." 

To this day, the NY Times has not taken responsibility for stabbing America in the back on Vietnam.  I'm sure they think that they did America a favor.  The lives of 60,000 American dead cry out.  The lives of thousands and thousands of American soldiers like Ron Kovic, left maimed cry out.  Shame, Shame: you worked for the enemy not your country.

The price paid for the Vietnam war - American only - not including financial costs:

Dead:  58,193
Wounded: 150,000
Missing: 1,600

Vietnamese Deaths:
Military:  444,000
Civilian:  587,000

Et tu Brutè?

Et tu Brutè?  (you Brutus?) were the last words of Julius Caesar in 44 B.C. when he was assassinated by being stabbed in the back by his good friend, Marcus Brutus.  One of the most shameful episodes in American history was the shameful betrayal of the brave men and women who answered their country's call to serve in Vietnam.  The Vietnam Veterans were treated as common criminals would be treated.  Returning Vietnam Veterans were not only not appreciated; they were despised.  What makes this even worse is that the men, most of them, were drafted and served their country honorably in a war that could not be won.  The war could not be won because American politicians put them in a box for which they could not get out of.  In Vietnam, you could not go after the enemy in their home turf.  You had to fight him within the confines of South Vietnam.  Advantage, the enemy.  The enemy could wait and attack you at their liking and at their advantage.  If they lost an engagement, as they often did, they would re-group at their convenience in North Vietnam.  No army can win with these conditions.  The Vietnam war was lost before one soldier hit the ground in Vietnam in the Kennedy Administration in the early 1960s.

Today, whenever we see a soldier in uniform, most people go up to them to thank them and sometimes pay for their meal.  This is great; that it the way it should be.  The Vietnam Veteran had a very different reception.  The returning vet would be spat upon or called "baby killer."  Let me recount my experience, and my experience was not the worst, by any means.  When I returned from Vietnam in May 1969, the commercial jet full of returning soldiers landed in Fort Lewis, Washington.  No one was there to greet us.  I remember thinking why the Army did not even think of welcoming us home?  No one thanked us.  No one talked to any of us.  I felt totally abandoned and forgotten.  All of us got out and disappeared on our own; most to other airports for flights to our home.  When I arrived at LAX, the only ones waiting for me were my family.  No one even looked at me, let alone thank me for your my service.

Prior to leaving for military service I was a college student and had worked part-time for Calavar Corporation, a Santa Fe Springs, California company that serviced the telephone company (Pacific Telephone), vehicles.  I had not planned on returning to this type of work but since I had not found other work, I decided to ask this company if they had any work for me.  Calavar hired me.  Upon reporting for work I was not assigned any particular work; I just roamed around and helped out anyone who asked me; I had no supervisor.  They basically left me alone; no one talked to me.  After the first week, someone presented me with my first check.  This person said absolutely nothing to me, just handed me the check without a word.  Upon opening the envelope.  I read the word Termination on it;  nothing else.  I never asked anyone anything; I just left.

Most people blamed the American soldier for losing the war, not the real culprit, the incompetent and self-serving politicians in Washington DC who's idea it was to send us there.  I went to Vietnam willingly, never questioning the cause.  As I think about it today, I recognize the absolute folly and idiocy of this war.  This was a war not based on any facts but on what we would call neurosis.  In those days, the West was afraid of the possible spread of communism.  This developed into a neurosis about it.  The  "Domino Theory"was trotted out by our government as the reason to fight communism.

As for the Vietnamese, they were fighting for their freedom.  They had been colonized by France for several hundred years.  After World War II they fought and defeated the French with the final climactic battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954.  The French fought brilliantly, but they were fighting, again, a war they could not win, no matter what.  The United States learned nothing from the failure of the French.  We ended up paying the price:  60,000 American dead and about 500,000 wounded; many wounded for life. Yet, when it came to thanking the American soldier for his sacrifices they spit in our face.  In a recent article President Obama recognized the shameful treatment of the Vietnam Vet.  Click here for the story.

There have been many wars where men lost their lives for no good reason and only for the folly, sometimes criminal folly, of such leaders as Hitler and Mussolini   The Nazis, for example, condemned over two million of their own men to death and 3.5 million wounded in Russia alone for a war that they could never have won.  Mussolini, condemned over 200,000 Italian soldiers to death in the Russian campaign of World War II supporting the Germans. The Hungarians, Romanians and Croats also sent troops to Russia and were eventually destroyed as well.  In 1805, the ambitious and despotic Napoleon Bonaparte, sent 500,000 French troops to Russia; only 5,000 returned alive.  All these men died in vain. All these men could say et tu Brutè? As my theme on this blog states:  Those who fail to learn from history are condemned to repeat it.

A Farewell to Arms

It was a hot, humid night in July 1968 in Nha Trang, South Vietnam.  Not far from my barracks was a huge U.S. Air Force Base, and a South Korean Army base.  Nha Trang was a seaside town that used to be a vacation spot during the French colonial period.  I was assigned to the First Field Force of II Corps. I had finally finished my 12 hour shift in the Personnel office and had gone to bed in my double bunk surrounded by my mosquito net.  Reading Ernest Hemingway's A Farewell to Arms had captured my intense attention.  No one ever wrote with such skill as Hemingway.  As I'm reading I could picture in my mind the horrors of war he was describing during World War I.  It all made sense.  I had now spent my first two months in a war zone.   I arrived in Vietnam  just after the Tet Offensive that started in February 1968.  As my Continental Airways passenger jet full of Army soldiers made its landing approach to Bien Hoa military airport, I first got a taste of the chaos of a war zone.  Looking to my right, I can seen the flash of artillery firing.  Upon landing we're loaded on a Isuzu bus and driven to the Cholon section of Saigon.  The sounds and noise of war was everywhere.

Upon arrival at the St. George Hotel in Saigon I could see that the front of the hotel was full of bullet holes.  I'm thinking that I had just landed in hell.  Helicopter gunships were circling the area, and the rat,tat, tat sounds of machine guns was everywhere. We were at the hotel awaiting our assignment in country.  After unloading my gear I see a fellow soldier holding out a recording device out of the window.  When I asked him what he was doing, he said that he was recording the sounds of the battle so he could send it home.  I asked him if he was kidding; he was not.  At the hotel bar I can see about six or seven Australian soldiers having a beer.  Before resting for the night I got the assignment of patrolling the perimeter of the hotel with my M-14 Rifle that I had trained with in Fort Ord, California.  I don't remember sleeping that night.  Having spent and entire year in a war zone, I think I can speak with experience that war is no party or no glory.  I will not spend any time defending the Vietnam war here; my purpose is a little different.

As an Italian immigrant to the United States,   I occasionally was asked were I was from, since I did not look like the typical blond, blue eyed Scandinavian looking fellow.  When I answered that I was from Sicily, Italy, I was often told idiotic Italian jokes about the Italian military (referring to World War II).  The most frequent quip was "what is the smallest book in the world?  A list of Italian military heroes."  Why a person would intentionally insult me to my face is beyond my understanding.  I suppose if I had been a tough hombre, I would have levelled the person with a left hook or  picked him up and tossed him into the freeway, or out of the building, but I did not.  I feigned a smile, unprepared for such idiocy. This did not happen once or twice but many, many times.  Happily I have not heard it in the last 10 or so years.

I've never been able to figure out the mentality of such insults.  Surely, people making these sick jokes have never been nor could they ever handle being in a war.   The intellectually challenged person making such jokes has never walked in another man's shoes.  The Vietnam veterans were betrayed by their own people when they returned home.  Here was a man who left home, left his parents, brothers and sisters, his girlfriend and all his friends to fight to the death in the Ia Drang Valley or Khe Sanh.  Or how about going to a war that you could not win because you were fighting with rules that put you in a box where you could not go out of.  A war that made no sense and the politicians refused to let you win.  If you survived and came home the people often spat at you and called you a killer.  The draft dodger that fled to Canada was considered the smart one, the brave soldier who died for his country was forgotten.

Where was the idiot who makes such jokes?  was he in the foxhole?  Was he thrown into a situation where it was hopeless to win or get out of?  As a history buff, I often watch military documentaries.  One of most poignant one is the documentary of the Siege of Leningrad during World War II where the entire German 6th Army, about 500,000 men, was condemned to die from war, cold or starvation because a lunatic such as Hitler had sent them there and then refused to let them withdraw when it was hopeless.  Would the idiot making such jokes have been to such a place?  I don't think so.